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BOOK REVIEWS
THE SUPREME COURT. By Bernard Schwartz.1 New York: Ronald
Press, 1957. Pp. v, 429. $6.50. That precocious professor of constitutional and administrative law, the youthful Bernard Schwartz, of the
New York University Law School, has provided an orderly, articulate
and meritorious book in this, the most recent of his prolific writings in
the field of American public law. His careful, comprehensive, but never
teclnical nor tedious analysis of the workings of the Supreme Court is
entitled to be regarded as the most significant contribution toward public
understanding of our high tribunal since Robert Jackson's, The Struggle
for Judicial Supremacy, was published in 1941. Indeed, Schwartz, more
lucidly than any of the recent commentators who have taken up the subject of the Supreme Court as an organ of our government, has spelled
out for his lay readers what the more sophisticated members of the bar
and of the political science fraternity know to be the fact. The Supreme
Court of the United States, though it may function as a court of law,
with all the familiar procedural and jurisdictional trappings which are
the delight of the legalist but the bane of the inquisitive layman, is
primarily an instrument of political government. Though the determinations of public policy which it must make are presented to it through
the medium of a law suit, they are, for the most part, questions which in
other countries would be the stuff of political controversy and, in the
less mature, even of revolution. The Court's role in American Government, as De Tocqueville observed early but accurately, is primordial.
Accordingly, Schwartz is correct in pointing out that, while American
political history may not be written exclusively in the terms of leading
Supreme Court decisions, it cannot really be understood unless those decisions are comprehended.
The lesson which Schwartz draws from his review of the Court's work
since 1937 is accurately deduced and fairly presented to his audience. It
is the author's prime thesis that, beginning in the spring of 1937, even
before the first New Deal judge, Hugo Black, had taken his place on the
high bench, the Supreme Court has been exercising an attitude of judicial
deference or restraint in passing upon the actions of the Congress, the
state legislatures, and those of the federal and state administrative agencies. The effect of this adherence to judicial self-restraint on the part of
the Supreme Court has been to produce a veritable revolution in our
public law jurisprudence. Unlike the Nine Old Men, the Court since
1937 has understood and properly carried out its duties as the keeper of
the Constitution. The people speak, and democracy, in the main, must
work or fail, through the elected representatives of the body politic. The
Supreme Court, on the other hand, has a more conservative function to
fulfill. Non-elective, not immediately responsive to public sentiment, and
never really a contemporaneous institution of government, the Court is
entrusted with interpreting a Constitution which in itself is essentially a
conservative check on the present by the past. Still, the Court must construe that document so as to permit the nation and the states to deal with
problems of the present and not those of the past. It can only carry out
1 Professor of Law, New York University.
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that function effectively if it concedes the pithy observation of Justice
Holmes that judges are "not God Almighty" and bases its decisions not
on its view of the wisdom or desirability of legislation or administrative
action but only upon reasonableness of such action. The pages of Professor Schwartz's book establish that the Supreme Court agrees with that
proposition and has applied it consistently since 1937.
However, having congratulated the Court for its espousal of judicial
self-restraint, Professor Schwartz proceeds to take several of its members apart for their refusal to be properly deferent to legislative or executive action in the field of civil liberties. Justices Black and Douglas and
the late Justices Murphy and Rutledge are the favorite targets of the
author's criticism. In his view, these justices, by refusing to defer to legislative mandate in the areas of free speech, free assembly, free exercise
of religion, loyalty and security, have indulged in an "absolutist" interpretation of the first amendment. Schwartz contends that the BlackDouglas faction, by rejecting judicial restraint in favor of judicial activism in their review of legislative action in the areas enumerated above,
are guilty of the same misapplication of the judicial function as the conservative justices who promiscuously struck down state and federal laws
from 1920 through the middle 30's. The author agrees with his favorite
justice, for whom he never is at a loss for an encomium, Justice Frankfurter, that there are no "preferred" Constitutional rights. As the late
Justice Jackson, with characteristic cleverness, but less than fair analysis
put it, you can not establish firsts "without thereby establishing seconds"
among constitutional rights. Schwartz believes that the Constitution is
not based "upon a hierarchy but upon an equality of values." Consequently, he claims that if self-restraint before the legislator is the proper posture
for the Court to take in cases involving property rights or economic regulation, there is no reason why this should not also be true in cases involving personal rights.
In expounding the above view, the author argues that it had its genesis
with Holmes and that its true prophet is Frankfurter. In this reviewer's
opinion, he is right only in his designation of Frankfurter as the most
consistent current expounder of this conception of the Court's function,
However, the view he states is neither Holmesian in origin nor correct in
content. There is an interesting paradox in the Holmes tradition. When
resolved, the paradox reveals that Frankfurter, Schwartz, and the others
who dispute a "preferred position" for the personal liberties protected by
the Bill of Rights are off the mark in their understanding of the proper
role to be observed by the Court in passing upon legislative and executive action which has an impact in that area of Constitutional guarantees.
Justice Holmes, the patron saint of judicial self-restraint, showed time
and again that his deference toward legislative action did not deter him
from objecting to legislative or executive action which interferred with
or impeded the "free competition of ideas" which constituted the essence
of his powerful, pragmatic philosophy. The author of the "clear and
present" danger test never gave any evidence, either in his opinions or
his other writings, that he believed that judicial. self-restraint was the
proper position for a judge to assume in the face of legislative action
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which attempted to restrict the right of any minority group or faction, or
individual, to think, speak, assemble, and petition freely.
We ask, then, was Holmes, the only "philosopher king" of American
Constitutional history, with the possible exceptions of Jefferson and
Wilson, inconsistent in repudiating judicial deference in the area of civil
liberties? Not at all. Few liberals would dispute that Holmes grasped the
essence of our democratic society. That essence inheres in the free interplay of competing ideas, with those approved by the majority entitled to
prevail, providing that these temporarily triumphant principles are not
put to such use as to curtail or restrict the basic democratic rights of the
minority to dissent from them and to agitate peacefully for their elimination or their replacement by their own points of view. In short, the sine
qua non of our democracy is the protection of the right to dissent and
the free competition of differing ideas. If we are less than vigilant in protecting that, we repudiate what we are - a free and democratic nation.
Holmes saw that. Justices Black and Douglas, and now it appears
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan also comprehend this quiddity
of our democracy. In this philosophy, the drawing of a distinction under
which the Court protects property rights only within the bounds of judicial self-restraint, while it guards the civil liberties and personal rights
guaranteed by the first amendment with a more active eye, is not only the
proper function of the Court but really, in view of the nature of our
government, its mandatory function. It is true, as the eminent poet Peter
Viereek has observed, that this special protection of personal and political
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights is an aristocratic or conservative
function of the Court. Still, it is a function that the Court as guardian of
the Constitution has a duty to perform. The foufiders of this country did
not intend the Bill of Rights to limit the Congress only in so far as the
Congress saw fit to abide by its prohibitions.
To answer Professor Schwartz's charge of inconsistency on the part of
the judicial "activists" one must remind him that when judges refuse to
substitute their concepts of public policy for those of the people by deferring to the judgment or command of the duly elected representatives
of the states and the nation, they are acting on the basis of an assumption,
which, though unstated, supplies the only real justification for judicial
deference. That predicate, which alone supports judicial self-restraint in
any area of the Court's jurisdiction, is that the representatives of the
people have earned the right to speak for their constituents as a result of
having been elected to office following a free contest of competing ideas,
political parties and groups, and in a free election. However, when these
successfully elected representatives proceed to enact legislation which attempts to restrict minority groups in the exercise of their right to dissent
or to assert their own views, whether in the realms of ideas, speech, religion, assembly, elections or public education, they are cutting at the
root of democratic government which is nothing else than the right to
dissent. Courts should defer to legislative supremacy only on the condition that such supremacy has been achieved by victory in the market
place of contesting political and social theories, parties and groups. When
our elected representatives attempt to curtail the competitive nature of
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the arena of the political struggle by laying restraints or placing impairments upon free speech, a free press, assembly, religion and the right to
the equality of educational opportunities in the public schools, they repudiate the major premise of our democratic system. Acknowledgement
of a broad power to govern does not include sanction of the power to
oppress.
This understanding of the nature of our government seems to have
escaped Professor Schwartz and explains his unrelenting criticism of those
justices who refuse to be "judicially restrained" in the face of legislative
invasions of civil liberties. However. if must be said in fairness to the
author, that on occasion he also suppresses his affinity for judicial selfrestraint and calls for "careful" judicial review in certain free speech
cases and in situations presenting question of equal protection of the laws,
such as the school segregation decisions.
On the whole, this is an excellent book. However, its appearance in
print at a time when the Court is under severe attack in many quarters
for some of its recent decisions in the civil liberties field is an unfortunate
circumstance. Apart from the uproar which greeted the Court's historic
opinions striking down the "separate but equal" principle in public school
education, there have been even more violent reaction to a group of
decisions which the Court handed down in the closing days of the last
term.2 Indeed, they might be grouped under three categories of the law,
all well-known to the legal profession, that is, (1) questions asked a
witness must be relevant, (2) a criminal statute is to be strictly construed,
and (3) fair procedure must be observed in administrative proceedings.
That these decisions should have produced the frenetic reaction which
they have created in many places indicates that a large segment of the
American public is misinformed not only as to what the Court actually
decided in these cases, but of the proper function of the Court in passing
upon questions involving rights guaranteed under the Bill of Rights. In
the cases discussed, the Court was acting in accordance with the Holmesian tradition and properly executing its duty to be vigilant, not deferent,
to legislative or administrative action which impinges on rights preserved
by the specific and sweeping provisions of the Bill of Rights. It is a pity
that the American public is so misinformed as to the proper role of the
Court in civil liberty matters. If they were not, the cries for the scalp of
the Court which are now heard, including the shocking proposal of
Senator Jenner to take away its appellate jurisdiction in loyalty-security
cases, never would have arisen. It is on this score that Professor Schwartz's
work is most distressing. Schwartz's book serves to add plausibility and
respectability to the current attacks on the Court. Therefore, Professor
Schwartz's work should be read with caution, if not skepticism. Despite
the author's contention to the contrary, there are indeed firsts and seconds
in a proper scheme of Constitutional values and the Supreme Court is
justified in varying the degree of deference shown in passing upon ques2 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
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tions involving personal liberties, as opposed to those affecting property
rights. If this book is read with that admonition in mind, then the author's
carefully labored and skillfully presented attempt to reincarnate the
philosophy of Justice Holmes through the decisions of Justice Frankfurter
will remain a resurrection that does not occur.
Alfred L. Scanlan*

PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT:

LEGAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES. By

Seymour J. Rubin.' Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. Pp. x, 108.
$3.50. The traditional hornbook form of presentation is of little utility in
the international law field. Black letter statements of the "True Rule" are
often wanting in reality. Much writing on international law is devoted to
elaboration of metaphysical subtleties which, while entertaining as intellectual exercise, contribute little to the solution of the day to day
problems generated by the facts of international life. In reaction, it is
sometimes voiced that there is no such thing as international law and that
international affairs would be conducted more effectively if lawyers and
statesmen would stop talking law and morality and would instead come
to grips with matters realistically.
This volume consists of a series of lectures delivered in Washington in
1955 under the auspices of the School of Advanced International Studies
of the Johns Hopkins University. The thesis of the lectures is the relationship of international law to contemporaneous political, economic and
social realities. The means of attack is to apply common law methods to
some of the problems of private foreign investment, thus bridging between the view that abstract concepts of law and justice are irrelevant in
the management of world affairs and the view that a comprehensive code
of international justice would be sufficient, in itself, to provide the answer
to all disputes among nations.
It is generally accepted in the Western World that private property
cannot be expropriated except for a public purpose and upon payment of
compensation. Early in the volume, the author examines reasons why
this rule and its corollaries so consistently give rise to serious controversy.
The author points out that the time has come to face the problem of defining the concept of "taking." Heretofore, the lack of definition has not
been felt acutely because most takings, such as those incident to the
Russian Revolution, have been plainly labelled as such. But the technique
of "creeping expropriation" - regulating the owner out of business without affecting his legal title - must be recognized and dealt with effectively
in order that our statements of policy and treaty provisions for the protection of investments may not become wholly illusory. That the author
does not offer an answer to the problem is hardly a fault. A sense of the
practical elicits recognition that foreign nations are not likely to give up
*

Member of Washington D.C. Bar.

1

Member of the bars of the District of Columbia and Illinois.
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their right to subject business to regulation simply because American or
other alien ownership is involved.
A chapter devoted to consideration of the status of enemy private
property critically assays the arguments advanced by both sides in the
current controversy over the fate of German and Japanese property
seized by the Alien Property Custodian. Not a special pleader for any
faction, Mr. Rubin asks only that the debate be carried on, free from
irrelevant abstractions such as "confiscation," in terms of the real questions. Should we subsidize the governments of these former enemy nations? Would we by doing so derive dividends in the form of closer
political and business relations? Regardless of the individual reaction to
these questions, it is apparent that private foreign investment is no longer
a matter of concern only to investors. Governments on both sides inevitably become embroiled in controversies that such investments engender.
The author confirms the reviewer's impression that existing treaty
commitments provide little real security for the investor. The reasons
for this conclusion are clearly articulated: (1) the emphasis in the treaties
on "declared" as distinguished from "creeping" expropriation and the
vagueness of the few provisions directed toward the latter; (2) the lack
of assurance that hard currency will be available for repatriation of earnings or for payment of compensation; and (3) the total absence of
treaties with many of the countries as to which assurances are most
needed. Perhaps we should recognize that treaty protection is likely to be
more theoretical than real, at least in the case of those nations which do
not subscribe to our economic views. Concentration of effort should be
toward development of techniques which protect in fact as well as in
theory, for the prospective investor is not interested in doctrines of international law but in the safety of his investment from undue interference.
Regrettably, Mr. Rubin makes only passing reference to the guarantee
program, which is surely the most constructive step taken in recent years.
The shortcomings of this program beg suggestions as to how the terms
could be rewritten so as to provide the prospective investor with real
assurance that his investment would be subject only to the normal risks
inherent in any new venture. It is not too much to hope that language
can be devised which, to a large extent, would protect against those
additional risks which private business does not face at home. If private
foreign investment is as desirable as most persons appear to think, the
government of the United States should be willing to expand the coverage
without increasing the already considerable premium to the point where
insurance becomes prohibitive.
The subject of these lectures is important and the complexities manifold. To those individuals, bar associations and other groups seeking to
improve the climate for foreign investment the present work represents
a dispassionate exposition of the underlying problems in their political
and economic context, and should be helpful in the development of
Alexis Coudert*
techniques consistent with international realities.
* Member of the Bar of New Yosk.
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Tum LIoN AND Tim THRONE: THE LiWE AND TIMES OF S EDWARD
CoxE. By Catherine Drinker Bowen.1 Boston: Little-Brown and Company,
1957. Pp. xii, 652. $6.00. The major themes of the recent American Bar
Association convention in London could have been inspired by Sir Edward
Coke. Lord High Chancellor Kilmuir spoke of "the doctrine of the law of
nature" which he said United States and England shared with a wider
community "even than that of the common law.... It is superior to all
other law because it belongs to mankind as mankind, and is the expression
of the purpose of the Deity or of the highest reason of man." United States
Attorney General Herbert Brownell set the other theme: "We must
establish an era where nations as well as individuals are subject to justice
under the law."2
Lord Kilmuir was declaring for a larger audience the doctrine which
Lord Coke applied in Doctor Bonham's Case almost three hundred fifty
years earlier, that Acts of Parliament against "common right and reason"
may be declared void. And Mr. Brownell was extending to nations the
famous Coke dictum that King James was "under God and the law."
An aim of the author in writing The Lion and the Throne was to
"recall a great man long forgotten." It is apparent from the report of the
ABA Convention proceedings that Coke has not been forgotten. It is
unlikely that any lawyer who reads this book will fail to remember Coke.
Most lawyers have read his famous statements arising from the Calvin
Case and Bonham Case. They have read the words but unless they understand what went before and what came after they can never appreciate
the fullness of the meanings of his views.
In narrative form, the author has recreated the times, the scenes, and
the characters which furnish the environment in which Coke's famous
words were spoken. The reader will understand the knowledge and courage needed by Coke to tell the king that he was not above the law, and
to challenge Parliament's right to legislate against "common right and
reason." Coke was truly the Lion guarding the English Throne, though
neither King James nor King Charles so understood. James and Francis
Bacon wanted Coke to be as one of the "twelve lions under Solomon's
Throne," circumspect of the King's sovereignty. They could not get what
they wanted: "When the time shall come I shall do that which should
become a Judge."
John Wu, in his Fountain of Justice, states that Maitland thought Lord
Coke was "the common law incarnate." There is ample basis for that
figure of speech in this book. Coke's father was a barrister who died,
leaving eight children, when Edward was but nine years old. The son
went through local primary and secondary schools, to Cambridge University and then became a member of the Inner Temple for the study of law.
He practiced and taught the common law for several years before Queen
Elizabeth called him to public service as her solicitor. The story of Coke's
service as Solicitor and Attorney General is the story of the early common
law in action. Coke was a "hard prosecutor and a just judge." His relent1
2

Author of Yankee From Olympus and other well known works.
70 Time Magazine, August 5, 1957, p. 8.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

148

[Vol. XX

II

less and cruel prosecution of Catholic "recusants" and Puritans represented the harshness of early common law applied with all its rigor.
Coke's extreme animosity toward these religious groups seems utterly
foreign to the idea of a great man. His attitude and actions cannot be
condoned but can be understood. He was a product of a hard Protestant
environment and was convinced that these dissidents were of grave danger
to England. Coke's demand for "reason" in law was a great influence in
the development of a just legal order, though in retrospect the Star
Chamber proceedings and the horrible punishments are hard to reconcile
with reason.
The pictures in this book of Coke's work as Chief Justice of the Common Pleas Court come closest to uncovering his heart. His work as a
jurist was work he loved; for lawyers, the part of the book telling of this
work should be particularly interesting and informative. As he rode from
place to place within his jurisdiction to supervise the work of justices of
the peace and to settle "clothes-line" disputes, he seemed more human
than at any other stage of his career. Here the reader sees the common law
in action in the countryside and here can be seen glimpses of the roots of
western legal culture.
As Mr. Common Law (the Maitland figure modernized), Coke fought
against encroachments on common law jurisdiction by Chancery and
Parliament. All the while he had to keep an eye on Francis Bacon, his
able, ambitious, corrupt and jealous competitor. Bacon brought about
Coke's dismissal as Chief Justice of England, but poetic justice eventually
saw Coke, as leader of Parliament, preside over Bacon's political demise.
It may surprise readers who think of Coke only as a jurist to learn that
Coke was a political match for Francis Bacon. The triumphs of Bacon
were due, not to his superior knowledge or skill, but to his place at the
King's ear. Coke was a good campaigner and a vigorous, fierce and able
debater. As Speaker of the House of Commons, early and late in his
career, he knew and used all the parliamentary tricks we find employed
today. He knew when to have bills called up for consideration and how
to solicit votes necessary for passage. He was a leader not only because
of his knowledge, skill and ability, but also because he was fearless in his
defense of English institutions against the powerful men he thought were
destroying them.
Proof that Coke deserves the praise of Maitland is found in the legal
literature that common law countries have inherited from his hand. His
Institutes and Commentaries on Littleton were for "nearly three centuries
the backlog of legal studies in England and America."' 3 This tremendous
literary output of forty years suggests an ivory-tower existence instead of
the thoroughly vigorous legal and political life during which they were
written. The capacity for scholarship and hurly-burly political and legal
activity is a mark of Coke's greatness.
Adherents to the natural law, since Coke's time, have always claimed
him as a leading authority for their cause. This book does not dwell in
3

Text at ix.
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detail upon his philosophy of law and does not purport to interpret his
famous statements about the supreme authority of law and reason.
Enough has been written elsewhere of his natural law views and the meanings of his statements to warrant the claim that the natural law men profess. In a letter to Justice Holmes, Fredrick Pollock wrote "... . law of
nature ( = natural justice = reason as understood in the Common Law)
.. "4 This explains what Coke meant by "law of nature" and "reason."
Coke went to his judicial doom like a classic tragic hero. Each stand
he took for "reason and the common law" was an episode in the drama
and the reader can see the eventual fall well in advance. But as King
James said, "Throw this man where you will and he falls upon his legs."
Kicked upstairs from Common Pleas to King's Bench and finally dismissed as Chief Justice of England, he was sent to Parliament. Banished
from Parliament once, he later became its leader and was called "Pater
Patriae." He was jailed in the Tower for seven months for "treason," but
imprisonment enhanced his reputation rather than hurt it. Only in his
family life did he not land on his feet. The story of his second marriage
with its meanness and quarrels and of trouble with his children is not a
pretty story. But the author has withheld nothing relevant, whether favorable or unfavorable, in writing an objective, complete biography of Coke.
The Lion and the Throne is a fit companion to the author's biographies
of John Adams and Justice Holmes. This "last of three" books is a distinctive addition in the tracing of American legal and political heritage to
its English sources.
Roger J. Kiley *

4

1 HOLMES - POLLOCK LETrERs 274 (Howe ed. 1941).

*

Justice, Appellate Court of Illinois.
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COKE. By Catherine Drinker Bowen, Boston: Little-Brown and
Co., 1957. Pp. xii, 652. $6.00.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

By Albert P. Blanstein and Clarence

DESEGREGATION AND T=E LAW.

Clyde Ferguson, Jr. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1957. Pp. xii, 333. $5.00. Considering the recent Supreme Court
decisions as to segregation issues, this book does not attempt to
explain the philosophy or sociology behind segregation, but devotes treatment to how the courts have resolved basic human
problems into concrete legal questions.
FUNDAMENTAL

LInERTIES OF A

FREE PEOPLE:

RELIGION,

SPEECH,

PRESS, ASSEMBLY. By Milton R. Kennetz. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957. Pp. xiii, 420. $5.00. A critical analysis of the
problems affecting fundamental liberties, designed to acquaint the
reader with a more thorough understanding of constitutional
rights.
COURTS
*THE SUPREME COURT. By Bernard Schwartz. New York: Ronald
Press, 1957. Pp. v, 429. $6.50.
CRIMINAL LAW
NOT GUILTY. By Judge Jerome Frank and Barbara Frank. Garden
City: Doubleday and Co., 1957. Pp. 249. $3.75. The late Jerome
Frank and his daughter have set forth highly interesting and
dramatic case studies involving conviction of innocent men, and
in a sensitive but sensible manner, show how such injustice in
criminal cases may be avoided.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
By
Seymour J. Rubin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. Pp. x,
108. $3.50.
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JURISDICTION
JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES. A report of
the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction over
Federal Areas within the States. Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1957. Pp. ix, 351. $1.25. This volume presents a
survey of the jurisdictional status of all federally owned real
property, and makes recommendations for the change in existing
state and federal laws for the purpose of eliminating problems
arising out of legislative jurisdiction.

JURISPRUDENCE
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN RETROSPECT. Edited by Arthur L.

Harding. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1957. Pp.
ix, 99. $3.00. A compilation of praiseworthy essays presenting a
history of law reform in America, and portending its future development.

SCHOOLS
THE LAw AND THE SCHOOL BUSINESS MANAGER. Edited by Leo 0.
Garber. Danville: Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1957.
Pp. viii, 331. In recognition of the legal implications of the
functions and acts of the school business manager, this book is
written to familiarize him with the law governing taxation, contracts, parliamentary procedure, and other fields as it affects his
activities.

TAXATION
THE JOINT VENTURE AND TAx CLASSIFICATION. By Joseph T. Aubman.

New York: Federal Legal Publications, 1957. Pp. vii, 493. $15.00.
The author points out the impact of the joint venture in the various fields of business activity, with detailed observations of tax
consequences and classifications of the joint venture.

INTENTIONAL BLANK

